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Abstract
We construct a model of valuation to assess the ￿nancial fragility of a set of ￿rms
in a closed economy. A ￿rm is identi￿ed with a possibly in￿nite random sequence
of bene￿ts. Firms with negative bene￿ts in a given period are said to be in distress
and need liquidity to re￿nance their projects. Those liquidities must be obtained from
￿rms with positive bene￿ts (which represent excess liquidities). Distressed projects are
re￿nanced to the extent that their need for liquidity does not exceed their endogenous
continuation value. This value is, in turn, a￿ected by current and future re￿nancing
possibilities. We provide a recursive procedure to compute this value when there is an
aggregate liquidity constraint. We compare the allocation under a centralized coalition
of ￿rms with that of a decentralized competitive liquidity market. We show that the
competitive market is more fragile because it does not value the possibility that a
currently distressed ￿rm could become a provider of liquidity some period in the future.
That is, the market value of a ￿rm can diverge from its social value due to externalities
involving the ability of that ￿rm to re￿nance other distressed ￿rms in the future.
1 Introduction
A system is ￿nancially fragile relative to another when its expected value in the steady state
is lower due to an inability to manage liquidity in the system in a manner that is dynamically
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1e￿cient. We show that a decentralized mechanism for allocating liquidity is more fragile than
a centralized system due to the divergence in social and market values of ￿rms when there
is a potential for aggregate liquidity constraints to bind in any period. That is, a market
mechanism is unable to correctly value ￿rms in terms of their ability to provide liquidity
to the system in the future, and hence can allow a ￿rm to go bankrupt even though it is
socially more valuable than another ￿rm that is re￿nanced. This is because this potential to
be a liquidity supplier in the future increases the values of other ￿rms but this externality is
not accounted for in the market value of ￿rms.
Correctly valuing a ￿rm (or a project) is a central issue in ￿nance. The value of a ￿rm
is typically equal to the expected discounted value of its future bene￿ts, conditioned on its
survival. In the autarkic case where no re￿nancing is available, the ￿rm will eventually go
bankrupt when there is a positive probability of distress, and the computation of its value
takes this probability into account. The probability of bankruptcy enters into the ￿e￿ective￿
discount rate. The di￿culty in the computation of the value arises when re￿nancing is poten-
tially available but subject to an endogenous liquidity constraint. In this dynamic context,
the ￿ow of future bene￿ts in the ￿rm is conditioned by the possibility of ￿nancial distress and
its ability to obtain re￿nancing in future periods, should it become distressed. Bankruptcy
is then endogenous to current and future re￿nancing possibilities, and the computation of
the ￿rm’s value becomes a non-trivial exercise.
In an environment of perfect ￿nancial markets, there are no liquidity constraints facing
the ￿rm as long as its value, net of its liquidity needs, remains positive. Firms are easy to
value in this world, and bankruptcy, when it occurs, is e￿cient. We present a model of ￿rm
valuation when ￿nancial markets are imperfect. We focus on a limited aggregate supply of
liquidity as a source of market imperfection. A ￿rm may not be able to obtain ￿nancing even
though it would be pro￿table to do so because the aggregate supply of liquidity is bounded.
This assumption can limit the extent of re￿nancing a ￿rm can obtain, and a￿ect its current
value. In addition, current and potential liquidity constraints create a divergence in a ￿rm’s
social and market value, which causes a decentralized market for liquidity to be dynamically
2ine￿cient, or, ￿nancially fragile.
In this model, a ￿rm is identi￿ed with an in￿nite random sequence of bene￿ts, conditional
on its survival. Each period, a ￿rm realizes a net bene￿t. For example, this bene￿t is its
cash ￿ow consisting of revenues minus costs net of any new investment requirement. If this
bene￿t is below a threshold level (normalized to zero), the bank is in distress and needs
re￿nancing to pursue its activities. Without re￿nancing, it must declare bankruptcy. If this
bene￿t is positive, the ￿rm can choose to either consume its bene￿ts, or use it to re￿nance a
distressed ￿rm. We obtain a procedure for valuing ￿rms when there is a potential aggregate
shortage of liquidity. We suppose that there is no deep-pocket ￿nancier that could re￿nance
all ￿rms whenever it is optimal to do so. Instead, we have a ￿nite number of ￿rms which
can provide ￿nancing to each other when they have the liquidity to do so. As long as a the
value of a ￿rm is greater than its liquidity needs, it is optimal to re￿nance it. This may not
be possible, however, if the other existing ￿rms do not generate enough liquidity to re￿nance
the distressed ￿rm. A ￿rm may become ￿nancially vulnerable because the aggregate supply
of liquidity in the economy is low, and not because its net value falls below zero.
Within this context, we study two speci￿c environments. In the ￿rst, we assume that all
￿rms are part of a coalition in which ￿nancing decisions are centralized to maximize the value
of this coalition. In each period, the set of surviving ￿rms is chosen to maximize the future
value of the coalition of surviving ￿rms. If there is an aggregate liquidity constraint, some
￿rms cannot be re￿nanced and must be shut down. The decision about which ￿rms should
survive in this case depends on the marginal contribution of ￿rms to the future value of the
coalition. This contribution depends on the ability of a given ￿rm to ￿rescue￿ some other
￿rms in the future. We compute a speci￿c two-￿rm example to illustrate our results. In the
second environment, we assume that, instead of a centralized decision-making mechanism,
there exists a market for liquidity and distressed ￿rms must borrow on this market at the
equilibrium rate of interest. For each period, we characterize the equilibrium interest rate
that determines which ￿rms are re￿nanced. These are the ￿rms that have the highest market
value net of re￿nancing costs.
3We then compare the e￿ciency of these two organizations. For each case, we show that
the economy converges to a stable coalition of ￿rms, a set in which no bankruptcies can
occur. This limit set may be history dependent. More interestingly, we show that the
two organizations can produce di￿erent sets of stable coalitions. Any stable coalition in a
decentralized market is also stable in the centralized organization, but the converse is not
true. In a decentralized market, the ￿rms with the highest market value net of re￿nancing
costs are re￿nanced. This value, however, does not include the impact that the ￿rm may have
on the future re￿nancing possibilities of other ￿rms. When there is an aggregate liquidity
constraint that is expected to be binding in some future period, each ￿rm has a shadow
value that depends on its potential for rescuing other ￿rms in that period. That is, each ￿rm
has an externality on the value of other ￿rms. 1 The market for liquidity cannot take this
externality into account while a centralized organization can. For example, suppose that ￿rm
A has a higher net market value than ￿rm B today, but that ￿rm B is more likely to ￿rescue￿
from bankruptcy ￿rm C in the future (maybe because its returns are negatively correlated
with those of ￿rm C). Suppose there is an aggregate liquidity constraint that prevents the
re￿nancing of both ￿rms A and B. A central planner may prefer to rescue ￿rm B than ￿rm
A if this increases the value of ￿rm C su￿ciently. However, a decentralized market does take
this externality into account when computing ￿rms’ value. In this sense, the market is not
dynamically e￿cient. This is why the market is more fragile than a centralized organization.
We use a simple numerical example to show how the market may fail to correctly compute
￿rm’s true value while a centralized coalitional organization would perform e￿ciently.
The issue of endogenous bankruptcy has already been studied in the literature on optimal
capital structure. Using a no-arbitrage argument, Merton (1974) computes the value of a
￿rm’s equity when its bene￿ts follow a di￿usion-type stochastic process. Merton (1974)
assumes that the ￿rm issues a zero-coupon bond with maturity at time T. If the assets’
value is less than the debt’s face value at T, the ￿rm is bankrupt and the equity is worth
0. This makes the equity value resemble a European call option, which is valued using the
1This externality vanishes when there is no aggregate liquidity constraint.
4Black and Scholes’ (1973) formula. Merton’s formula per se does not consider bankruptcy as
an endogenous event. It can be used, however, to price any claim on a ￿rm whose bene￿ts
are described by a di￿usion process.
Leland (1994) considers a more complex type of debt with a continuous coupon, and
computes the equity value when bankruptcy is either exogenous or endogenous. Bankruptcy
is exogenous when it is triggered by the assets’ value falling below a predetermined exogenous
target level. Bankruptcy is endogenous when it is triggered by the impossibility to pay the
coupon by issuing additional equity. In this case, there is a minimum value VB of the ￿rm’s
assets below which equity is worth 0 and the ￿rm is bankrupt. The ￿rm chooses this lower
bound to maximize the total value of the ￿rm. On the one hand, the lower bound VB must
be low enough to minimize the occurrence of bankruptcy; on the other hand, it cannot be
too low since equity must remain positive for assets’ value above the bound. Leland (1994)
￿nds that the lower bound VB on the assets’ value that triggers bankruptcy is proportional
to the debt coupon, independent of current assets’ value, increasing in the risk-free rate of
interest and decreasing in the volatility of the assets’ value process. Leland (1994) assumes
that the ￿rm can always re￿nance on the market as long as its equity value is positive. This
translates into an environment of perfect ￿nancial markets. In this model, bankruptcy is
said to be e￿cient.
Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (1999) also study the fragility of an economic system in
which there is an aggregate liquidity constraint. Borrowers and lenders are matched and,
in each period, lenders get a random liquidity endowment. The realized endowment a￿ects
the viability of a match. The main di￿erence of this paper from our approach is that they
assume that there is no short-run market for liquidity. Assuming that liquidities can ￿ow
across agents is a main feature of our analysis. We show that an economy may still be fragile
despite having a short-run competitive market for liquidities.
In section 2, we introduce the model and notation. We then compute the value of a ￿rm
in two benchmark cases: in autarky and when there is a deep-pocket ￿nancier who supplies
5liquidity in each period. In the following sections, we assume that the aggregate supply of
liquidity is ￿nite and given by the cash ￿ow realizations of all ￿rms in the economy (that is,
it is endogenous). In section 3, we develop our centralized coalitional model and illustrate
our results with a two-￿rm example. In section 4, we assume a decentralized market for
liquidity in each period, and characterize the market equilibrium. In section 5, we compare
the e￿ciency of the two organizations and illustrate our results with a numerical two-￿rm
example. The conclusion follows.
2 The model
Consider a multi-period, single good economy where all consumers have (risk-neutral) linear
preferences with respect to random consumption paths. They discount future consumption
by a common factor δ. Consumers are assumed to have rational expectations, that is, they
perfectly anticipate future prices and coordinate on the same equilibrium if many equilibria
can exist.
There is an in￿nite random sequence of i.i.d. states (sn)n∈N where n is a time subscript.
Each state sn is drawn from (S,S,µ) where S is a compact set of states, S is a σ-algebra on
S and µ is a probability measure. In what follows, the time subscript is dropped whenever
this does not create any confusion. Hence, s usually refers to the current state.
There are N productive projects, owned by the consumers. 2 The number of projects
can decrease in time with the occurrence of bankruptcy. However, we forbid the entry of
new projects. Each period, projects generate random bene￿ts measured in units of the
consumption good. A project is described by a measurable continuous function y : S → R
which relates each state, s, to the random bene￿t, y(s), the project generates in that state.
A negative bene￿t generated by a project represents a temporary shortage of liquidity
that prevents it from investing in its technology in order to continue to create value in the
2In this paper, we use the terms ￿project￿ and ￿￿rm￿ interchangeably.
6future. A negative bene￿t that is not re￿nanced results in the bankruptcy of the project. We
assume limited liability so that if a project has a negative bene￿t and declares bankruptcy,
it forgoes its ￿nancial liabilities. A bankrupt project can never be reactivated so that if it
goes bankrupt in period n, it brings a bene￿t of zero in period n and all subsequent periods.
A positive bene￿t, on the other hand, creates excess liquidities that can be used to re￿nance
other projects or consumed by the owners of the project. There is no storage technology for
transferring liquidities in the current period to a future period: all positive bene￿ts created
in the economy must be used in the same period.
A project is said to be in ￿nancial distress in state s if y(s) < 0. We say that the project
is solvent in one period if its bene￿t is non-negative or if it can obtain re￿nancing to survive
until next period. Since there is no storage technology, re￿nancing can only be obtained
from positive bene￿ts realized by other projects.
Let us denote the current population of N projects by y. For a subset z of the population
y, z(s) is the set of bene￿ts generated by each project in z in state s. The sum of the elements
of z(s) is denoted by Σz(s). Furthermore, z(s)+ is the subset of those bene￿ts that are non-
negative, and z+
s is the subset of z obtained using the labels associated with the values of
z(s)+. z(s)− and z−
s are de￿ned the same way.
Autarky
A project that lives in complete autarky has no access to any re￿nancing. It is solvent if
and only if its bene￿t is non negative. The value of an autarkic project is then the expected
discounted sum of its current and future bene￿ts taking into account that it goes bankrupt
whenever its bene￿t y(s) is negative. Up to a bankruptcy episode, bene￿ts are stationary.
Hence, the continuation value is either zero if the project is bankrupt or some constant
non-negative expected discounted value if the project is solvent.
7Let us denote by y+ (y−), the set of states in which y(s) ≥ 0 (y(s) < 0), that is,
y
+ ≡ {s ∈ S|y(s) ≥ 0}, and y
− ≡ {s ∈ S|y(s) < 0}.
We will keep this notation for any other measurable function on S throughout the paper.
Under the assumption of stationarity of the bene￿t function y, the value of the project only





y(s) + δV0(y) if s ∈ y+,
0 if s ∈ y−,
(1)
where δ ∈ (0,1) is the discount rate. Let us denote V0(y) the expected value of v0(y).
Because bene￿ts are stationary, this expected continuation value is constant. Hence, taking











where E{y|y+} is the conditional expectation of y given event the set y+. Equation (2) yields
a formula for the valuation of a currently solvent project that has a constant probability µ(y−)
of becoming bankrupt.
Unconstrained re￿nancing for a single project
Let us suppose that the project has access to re￿nancing in states where its current bene￿t
is negative, y(s) < 0. Re￿nancing the project makes economic sense if its continuation value
is greater than its current liquidity requirement −y(s). Thus, current and future re￿nancing
can increase the value of the project. This implies that the continuation value itself is a￿ected
by the availability of re￿nancing in the future. Hence, the probability that the project fails
8again in the future is not necessarily µ(y−), and V0(y) is no longer the expected future value
of the project.
In states s where y(s) < 0, the project needs at least −y(s) in order to face its liquidity
requirement and survive until next period. The maximal amount of liquidities the ￿rm can
raise is equal to the expected discounted value of all future bene￿ts, again taking into account
future possibilities of bankruptcy and re￿nancing.
De￿ne by S∗ the set of states in which the ￿rm is either not distressed or is successfully
re￿nanced, and, therefore, solvent. Since the decision to re￿nance is independent of current
￿nancial liabilities and bene￿ts are stationary, the set S∗ is time independent. Using similar
computations as those in the previous section, the expected discounted value of all future






This is the maximum amount of ￿nancial capital the ￿rm can raise. Hence, the ￿rm is






∗} ≥ 0. (3)
The set S∗ is the set of states s for which condition (3) is satis￿ed. It is easy to see that,
if s ∈ S∗, then all states s0 such that y(s0) ≥ y(s) are also in S∗. This implies that there
exists some lower bound y∗ below which the ￿rm is optimally bankrupt.
The lower bound y∗ must be negative, because it is never optimal to declare bankruptcy
when the current bene￿t is positive. The set of solvency states is given by S∗ = {s ∈









+} = 0. (4)
This equality implicitly de￿nes the set S∗.
We can now compute the expected value of the project, using y(s) < y∗ as the bankruptcy





y(s) + δVy∗(y) if s ∈ S∗,
0 if s ∈ S \ S∗.
(5)











Equation (6) gives the expected value of the project in an environment without liquidity
constraints. This value depends on the time-independent survival policy function which
characterizes the e￿cient bankruptcy rule. For y(s) ≥ y∗, it is pro￿table to keep the project
operating. Bankrupting it would destroy value since its future value is larger than the amount
of liquidity required to keep it solvent. For y(s) < y∗, it is optimal to bankrupt the project
since its future value is smaller than the amount of liquidity required to keep it solvent.
Without an aggregate liquidity constraint, a project can raise funds up to its discounted
expected value taking into account the probability of bankruptcy. The value Vy∗(y) can be
compared to the autarkic value V0(y), which corresponds to the case y∗ = 0. It is easily
shown that Vy∗(y) ≥ V0(y), and therefore the availability of outside liquidity raises the value
of the project.
Re￿nancing ￿rms in the face of aggregate liquidity constraints
From now on, we relax the assumption that there is no aggregate liquidity constraint. We
suppose instead that liquidities have to be supplied by existing projects and hence cannot
exceed the sum of positive bene￿ts in the economy, Σy(s)+. Therefore, a project must rely
on other projects’ liquidities to re￿nance a negative bene￿t. However, the availability of
re￿nancing for a project also depends on the demand for liquidity by other projects. This
10means that there might be some states where a given project should optimally be re￿nanced
but may not be, due to aggregate liquidity being insu￿cient. The survival of a project now
depends on the aggregate liquidity of the economy. That means that the value of a project
y is no longer equal to Vy∗(y).
For example, there may be states s and s0 such that y(s) = y(s0) but the project is
solvent in state s and bankrupt in state s0 although its current liquidity requirement and
future expected value are the same in both states.3 Liquidity constraints may bind at the
aggregate level so that states s and s0 di￿er in the sense that it is easier for the project to get
re￿nancing in state s than in state s0. Hence, liquidity constraints increase the probability
that a project fails and reduce its value. 4 This is important since when a project goes
bankrupt, the aggregate ￿ow of liquidity in the future is reduced. This could jeopardize the
solvency of other projects in the future.
The determination of which distressed projects go bankrupt when there is not enough
aggregate liquidity for all of them depends on the allocation mechanism. In the next section,
we compute project values when aggregate liquidities are optimally allocated by a central
planner. The optimal allocation maximizes the value of the group of projects surviving in
each possible state of nature. In section 4, we decentralize the allocation of funds so that
projects can obtain funds from a liquidity market at a competitive price.
3Since a state s is a description of the whole economy, it is conceivable that a project may have the same
bene￿t in two di￿erent states, while bene￿ts of other projects di￿er in these two states.
4To a large extent, our model ￿ts this story: exogenous shocks on the total supply of funds a￿ect the
￿e￿ective￿ discount rate di￿erent projects face since they a￿ect their probability of bankruptcy. This can be
contrasted with standard macroeconomic models where changes in the ￿e￿ective￿ discount rate are driven
by exogenous technological shocks.
113 A centralized model of re￿nancing
The ability of projects to obtain re￿nancing is limited by the aggregate constraint on the
supply of liquidity. We derive a recursive formula to compute the value of a coalition of
projects. A coalition is a ￿nite set of projects belonging to a network and that provide
each other with liquidities. Our approach is to maximize the current expected value of the
coalition’s liquidities. This is done through a complex ￿nancial ￿contract￿ that optimally
assigns realized liquidities to a surviving coalition.
3.1 The coalition model
We take the convention that y denotes the current coalition before the realization of the
state of nature in any period. Since there is no entry of new projects and not all projects
survive from one period to the other, the existing population may decrease with time. A
coalition y faces a liquidity constraint in a given state, if the sum of all positive liquidities
in the coalition is lower than the sum of requirements by distressed projects that are worth
saving.5 In this case, only a sub-coalition of y can survive and some projects must disappear.
The centralized mechanism optimally designs a survival policy that determines which project
should be re￿nanced and which should be bankrupted. The coalition z that survives after
coalition y, and realization of state s, is feasible if and only if it satis￿es the following two
properties:
Admissibility (AD): If a project y has a non-negative bene￿t in state s, then it must
belong to the surviving coalition in state s. Equivalently, if z is solvent in state s, then
y+
s ⊆ z.
Budget Balance (BB): If coalition z survives in state s, then
−Σz
−
s (s) ≤ Σz
+
s (s).
5The decision of which projects are worth re￿nancing will be explicitly analysed and this decision depends
on the allocation mechanism we assume.
12In any given state s, admissibility requires that all projects in the set y+
s survive. Budget
Balance ensures that the surviving coalition satis￿es the aggregate liquidity constraint. This
is possible if and only if the total liquidity requirement of these distressed projects in the
surviving coalition, z, does not exceed the total liquidity generated by the projects with
positive bene￿ts.
The optimal survival policy maximizes the value of the surviving coalition. It is thus
necessary to compute the value of all possible coalition of projects. Suppose that we know
how to compute the expected value of an arbitrary coalition of projects z of size less than
or equal to M ≥ 1. Let V (z) be this expected value. In what follows, we show how to
compute the value of an arbitrary coalition y of M + 1 projects. Let 2y be the power set of
sub-coalitions of y. Assume that the current set of active projects is y. In state s, an optimal
survival policy selects a coalition that solves
Program 1 : max
z∈2y Σz(s) + δV (z),
s.t. y
+
s ⊆ z, (AD)
− Σz
−
s (s) ≤ Σz
+
s (s). (BB)
This problem is well de￿ned by assumption, up to V (y) which is unknown. That is, the ex-
pected value V (z) of all subcoalitions z of no more than M projects is known by assumption,
but the expected value of the (current) coalition y of M + 1 projects is unknown.
By admissibility (AD), for all states s such that y−
s is empty, the set of instruments
contains only y and Program 1 reduces to
Σy(s) + δV (y). (7)
13Consider now the states for which y−
s is not empty. The following restricted program (for
which y is not a solution) is now well de￿ned,
Program 1a : max
z∈2y Σz(s) + δV (z),
s.t. y
+
s ⊆ z, (AD)
− Σz
−




By construction, we know how to solve Program 1a since V (y) need not be evaluated.
Program 1 can be represented as a dynamic program where, if y−
s is non-empty, one
decides ￿rst if y should survive and, in the case where it should not, which coalition z should
survive. De￿ne the random variable ν : S → R that takes the value of Program 1a. The
value v(s) of Program 1 then becomes
v(s) =

     
     




Σy(s) + δV (y),ν(s)
	
, if y−
s 6= ∅ and Σy(s) ≥ 0,
ν(s), otherwise.





s ∈ S|Σy(s) + δV (y) ≥ ν(s) and Σy(s) ≥ 0
	
.
This is the set of states where the full coalition y survives, either because y−
s is empty, or
because it is feasible and pro￿table to re￿nance all distressed projects. In what follows, we
assume that µ(S∗) ∈ (0,1). The following lemmas describe the solution.
Lemma 1. {s ∈ S|y−
s = ∅} ⊆ S∗ ⊆ {s ∈ S|Σy(s) ≥ 0}.
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
14Lemma 2. Monotonicity. Let s ∈ S∗ and consider s0. If, for all projects, y(s0) ≥ y(s), then
s0 ∈ S∗.
For any given y, the value of the coalition y, is the real number V (y) that solves (8):
V (y) = max
S∗ µ(S
∗)(E(Σy|S
∗) + δV (y)) + (1 − µ(S
∗))E(ν|¬S
∗). (8)
We have shown in section 2 that a coalition composed of a single project ( y = {y})
has an expected value of V (y) = V0(y). We have shown that if we know how to compute
the expected value of M projects or less, we may compute the value of M + 1 projects. By
induction, we can therefore compute the expected value of an arbitrary but ￿nite coalition
of projects. In the next section, we do so explicitly for a coalition of 2 projects.
3.2 A two-project coalition
Let y = {y1,y2}. We know that V (y1) = V0(y1) and that V (y2) = V0(y2). We want to
compute V (y). To do so, we need to identify S∗.
By Lemma 1, we need only to identify those states where only one project is distressed
and it makes economic sense to re￿nance it. If yj(s) > 0 > yi(s) and yi(s) + yj(s) ≥ 0, then
project yi will be rescued if
yi(s) + yj(s) + δV (y) ≥ yj(s) + δV0(yj),
that is, if
yi(s) ≥ δ(V0(yj) − V (y)) ≡ y
∗∗
i .
Hence, both projects remain solvent as long as Σy(s) ≥ 0 and each yi(s) is at least equal to
some endogenous stationary value y∗∗
i that depends on V (y). V (y) may be obtained as the
solution to (8) where
S
∗ = {s ∈ S|y1(s) ≥ y
∗∗
1 ,y2(s) ≥ y
∗∗
2 and y1(s) + y2(s) ≥ 0}.
15Notice that the fact that y∗∗
i is independent of s is an artifact of the two-project coalition.
In general, this threshold value depends on the state s. For example, suppose there are three
projects. Further assume that only one project is solvent (say project 1) and that it can
only re￿nance one of the two distressed projects. Whether say project 2 is re￿nanced or not
depends not only on the net future payo￿ of doing so (as it is the case with two projects),
but also on the cost of bankrupting project 3. This cost depends on the current amount of
liquidity needed to re￿nance project 3. Hence, the survival rules depends on the state s for
a coalition of three or more projects.
Finally, it is now possible to isolate the individual value of a single project within coalition
y. Denote the value of project yi ∈ y by
V
yi(y) =
µ(S∗ ∪ Syi)E(yi | S∗ ∪ Syi) + µ(Syi)δV0(yi)
1 − δµ(S∗)
,
where Syi is the set of states for which only project yi is solvent. The value of project yi
depends implicitly on the value of the whole coalition through its dependence on the set S∗.
Individual values are such that V y1(y)+V y2(y) = V (y). However, the individual value must
be distinguished from the contributory value of yi to coalition y. The contributory value is
the di￿erence of values between the coalition y with the project yi and the coalition without
it, that is,
CV




where y \ yi is the remaining coalition after removing project yi from the coalition y. The
sum of the two contributory values in the coalition y exceed the value of the coalition, or,
CV
y1(y) + CV
y2(y) = 2V (y) − V0(y2) − V0(y1) > V (y).
The contributory value of a project exceeds its individual value: CV (yi) = V (y) − V0(yj) >
V (y) − V yj(y) = V yi(y) since V0(yj) < V yj(y). Each project, therefore, has a shadow value
that re￿ects its externality on the value of the other project.
164 Decentralization
We now decentralize our coalition economy to examine the characteristics of the surviving
set of projects when re￿nancing can be obtained from other projects at a market price. A
project that realizes a positive bene￿t in any period is a supplier of funds at that period. A
distressed project has a demand for liquidity whenever its realized bene￿t is negative.
4.1 The liquidity market
There is a spot market for funds on which the size of supply and demand determines the
equilibrium price of liquidity, that is, the lending rate. Funds are measured in units of the
consumption good. However, the liquidity market excludes the demand for ￿nal consumption
of the good. Once funds have been allocated on the liquidity market, the residual funds, if
any, are transferred to the consumption market, where they are consumed.
A project may enter a period with an obligation to repay a debt or a claim on the debt
repayment from its participation in the liquidity market in the previous period. Suppose that
a project with a negative bene￿t today has lent the amount x > −y(s)/R in a previous period
that entitles it to receive Rx today. In that case, the project’s net liquidity is y(s)+Rx > 0.
Nevertheless, if the project’s owners decide to use the amount Rx to rescue their project,
they are lending the liquidity to themselves. An alternative option would be to let the project
die and invest Rx on the liquidity market. A negative bene￿t indicates that an investment
in the project is required in order for it to survive, this does not mean that the project’s
owners owe −y(s) and are obliged to pay for it out of their loans portfolio. Hence, whether
it is used by the project to re￿nance itself or invested in other project, the amount Rx is
part of the supply of fund. For the same reason, the amount −y(s) potentially becomes part
of the demand for funds.
The ￿nancial instrument exchanged by projects on this market is generic. It could be
a share in the project or a promise of a future payment. Since all agents are risk-neutral,
17the equilibrium risk premium is necessarily zero. Consequently the value of every ￿nancial
instrument is equal to its expected discounted payo￿ measured in units of the good.
Supply of funds
The supply of funds in state s is driven by the constant marginal rate of substitution of
consumers, δ, since consumers supply funds on the liquidity market through their ownership
of the various projects. The liquidity generated by projects that are not distressed in state
s is Σy(s)+. Let R be the market interest rate. Then, consumers agree to provide liquidity
on the market as long as R ≥ δ−1. If R is too low, consumers prefer to consume the funds




     
     
0 if R < δ−1,
[0,Σy(s)+] if R = δ−1,
Σy(s)+ if R > δ−1.
Demand for funds
The demand for funds comes from distressed projects. A project with bene￿t y(s) < 0 needs
−y(s) to be rescued. Other projects will agree to ￿nance −y(s) > 0 as long as they receive
a ￿nancial instrument that is worth at least −y(s). Since they are the residual claimants of
the project’s portfolio, the owners of the project are willing to issue a claim worth −y(s) on
future bene￿ts if keeping the project alive has more value than −y(s). Let Vm(y) be project
y’s market value if rescued. The project is said to be solvent if
Vm(y) ≥ −y(s)R.
The owners of a project that is not solvent will never choose to seek re￿nancing for it. 6
Hence, the demand for funds from insolvent projects is zero.
6Another way to state this is that a project that is not solvent is not allowed on the market.





{0,−y(s)} if Vm(y) = −y(s)R,
−y(s) if Vm(y) > −y(s)R.





s |Vm(y) ≥ −y(s)R
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Because the demand for funds by a solvent project is insensitive to the rate of return and
because there is a ￿nite number of projects (all with positive measure), the demand for funds
is discontinuous since a marginal raise in the rate of return can turn a solvent project into
an insolvent one and reduce its demand from some positive amount, −y(s), to zero. As a
result, an equilibrium in which demand and supply are equated may fail to exist for some
con￿gurations of the parameters. As we shall see, the set of parameters where that happens
is of measure zero. Nevertheless, we adapt our description of the market mechanism to
preclude the non existence of an equilibrium.
Demand is non-increasing, zero if the market price R is su￿ciently high, and equal to
−Σy(s)− ≥ 0 if the market price is zero. Likewise, supply is non-decreasing, zero if R is
low and equal to Σy(s)+ ≥ 0 if R is high. An equilibrium would surely exist if demand
was continuous. At a very high price such that demand is zero and supply is Σy(s)+, excess
supply equals Σy(s)+ ≥ 0. At a price of zero, excess supply equals Σy(s)− ≤ 0. By the
theorem of the mean value, there is a value of R for which this di￿erence is equal to zero.
Discontinuities in demand imply that there may be excess supply at some price R and
excess demand at some price R0 which is marginally lower that R. Our notion of an equilib-
rium must thus account for an excess supply at the ￿equilibrium￿ price R. As we shall see,
19the behavior of the model depends crucially on the total demand that can be accommodated
by the market. An excess supply of funds only a￿ects the timing of consumption but has
no e￿ect on the overall performance of the economy. Consequently, we devise a rationing
device that regulates an excess supply to yield an equilibrium on the market.
The device works as follows. Suppliers in the market are told that if there is a strictly
positive demand, an unspeci￿ed strictly-positive fraction α, α ∈ (0,1], of their supply will be
channelled through the market. The rest of their supply will be returned for consumption.
Notice that the supply of funds is una￿ected by this device: if supplying z was optimal when
the price is R and α = 1, then supplying z is still optimal as long as α > 0. Once the
demand and the supply of funds have been expressed at an equilibrium price (to be de￿ned
below), the parameter α is set by the market operator to a value that clears the market:
α = Y D/Σy+.
An equilibrium is reached when the price R clears the market with α = 1 or when there is
excess supply and a reduction of the price R would lead to an excess demand. This de￿nition
captures the idea that competition among suppliers should drive R down. Formally, given
the demand and supply schedules Y D and Y S, we have an equilibrium price R∗ when either
1. Y D(s,R∗) = Y S(s,R∗).
2. Y D(s,R) < Y S(s,R) for all R ≥ R∗ and Y D(s,R) > Y S(s,R) for all R < R∗.
The equilibrium allocation is de￿ned to be Y D(s,R∗). Various possible equilibrium con￿gu-
rations are represented in Figure 1 in Appendix B.
4.2 A two-project economy
Suppose there currently exist two projects on the market: y1 and y2. Each project has a
continuation value that is equal to the expected discounted value of all its future bene￿ts.
The discount rate must be the equilibrium interest rate. Notice that in a case with only two
20projects, the equilibrium rate is R∗ = δ−1. If supply exceeds demand, either the distressed
project has −Vm(yi)/yi(s) ≥ δ−1 and the project is re￿nanced at rate R∗ = δ−1 or the project
fails and there is no exchange. If demand exceeds supply, the distressed project cannot be
re￿nanced, regardless of its value, and the market collapses. In any case, there is no room
for an equilibrium lending rate higher than δ−1.
The expected value of future bene￿ts depends on the probability of failure of the projects
in the future. Moreover, continuation values depend on the state prevailing today, namely,
a project can have three possible continuation values: (1) either the project fails and the
continuation value is 0, (2) or the other project fails and yi’s continuation value is its autarkic
value V0(yi), or (3) no project fails and yi’s continuation value is the two-project market value
Vm(yi). Notice that in an i.i.d. environment, Vm(yi) does not evolve in time. Let us describe
all the potential market con￿gurations that follow the realization of a state of nature.
1. States Sall such that yi(s) > 0 for all i.
In those states, Y D(s,R) = 0 at all R. Both projects survive with no exchange of
liquidity and will be on the market next period. Their continuation value is Vm(yi), ∀i.
2. States S∅ such that yi(s) < 0 for all i.
In those states, Y S(s,R) = 0 at all R. Both projects die, and their value reverts to 0.
There will be no market open next period.
3. States Scstr
i such that yi(s) < 0 < yj(s) with yi(s) + yj(s) < 0.
In those states, the aggregate liquidity constraint binds. Project yi fails, its value
reverting to 0. Project yj survives with its autarkic value V0(yj).
4. States ˆ Si such that yi(s) < 0 < yj(s) with yi(s) + yj(s) > 0.
In those states, yi needs re￿nancing from yj. Since the liquidity constraint does
not bind, there is an excess supply of funds that drives the equilibrium interest rate
to R∗ = δ−1. Hence, project yi receives re￿nancing −yi(s) if its continuation value
Vm(yi) is at least equal to yi(s)/δ. Let us partition the set of states ˆ Si into
214.1 ˆ S
+
i , set of states such that Vm(yi) ≥ yi(s)/δ so that project i ￿nds re￿nancing at
the market rate and can, therefore, survive with continuation value Vm(yi);
4.2 ˆ S
−
i , set of states such that Vm(yi) < yi(s)/δ so that the project’s value reverts to
0 and it fails.
The partition of ˆ Si is endogenous since it depends on the market value Vm(yi) itself.
Since the autarkic value V0(yi) has been determined in section 2 for any yi, only the
market value Vm(yi) is left to compute. This value is the continuation value of project yi
following the realization of a state in either Sall or ˆ S
+
i . Since the probability of failure of
project i in the future depends on its decision to re￿nance yj in earlier periods, both values
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22y1(s) + δVm(y1) ≥ 0, y1(s) < 0, and y1(s) + y2(s) > 0 for all s ∈ ˆ S
+
1
y2(s) + δVm(y2) ≥ 0, y2(s) < 0, and y1(s) + y2(s) > 0 for all s ∈ ˆ S
+
2 .
The partition of the set S is much more complex in a case with three projects. It
encompasses the states in which all projects fail, those in which only two project fail, leaving
the other one in autarky, and the case where only one project fail, leaving the two others
with those two-project market values. Finally, the projects’ market values in the states
where all three survive rely on all these less-than-three-project cases and a rate of interest
R∗ that can be higher than δ−1. Having computed the three-projects values, it is possible to
￿nd the market values in the four-project case with an even more complex partition of the
set of states of nature. Appendix C provides a numerical example where market values are
computed in a two-project case.
5 Static and dynamic e￿ciency
Since the value of projects, and hence the survival rule, depends on whether liquidities are
allocated by a central planner (centralized mechanism) or through a decentralized liquidity
market, the allocation mechanism can condition the fragility of the system. To compare the
performance of both mechanisms, we need to be able to compare the set of existing projects
in each case, after a given history of realization of the states of nature. A natural point of
comparison is the coalitions arrived at in the steady state under the two mechanisms. We
will explain the notion of fragility more clearly when we have de￿ned the idea of a steady
state.
Let y be a running coalition of projects. As the history of shocks evolves, this coalition
shrinks if some projects become bankrupt. Hence, the number of surviving projects weakly
decreases through time until a stationary state is reached. Let us de￿ne this stationary state
with the notion of stable coalition. 7
7Note that the term coalition in this context does not imply that the allocation mechanism is centralized.
23De￿nition 1 (Stable coalitions). Let y be the existing coalition in the beginning of a
period. The coalition y is stable if it is the surviving coalition after any realization of the
state of nature in this period.
A stable coalition de￿nes the stationary state because states of nature are drawn from
identical and independent distributions in every period. If a coalition survives through all
states in one period, it must survive in any state in the future.
There are two necessary conditions for a coalition y to be stable. One condition is that
budget balance holds in every state of nature, or there are no states in which the aggregate
liquidity constraint is binding. The other condition is that no project has to be bankrupted
in any state of nature. This latter condition di￿ers according to whether the mechanism is
centralized or not.
Stable coalition with a centralized mechanism In a centralized allocation mecha-
nism, y is a stable coalition if y is feasible and if there is no smaller coalition that would







y = arg max
z
X
z(s) + E(V (z)) for alls ∈ S.
Stable coalition on a decentralized market In a decentralized mechanism, y is stable
if, in all possible states, the supply of funds is greater than the demand for funds and no








∗ ≤ R = min
y∈y−
s
{−Vm(y)/y(s)} for all s ∈ S.
If the existing coalition of projects is stable in a market equilibrium, the aggregate liquidity
constraint never binds and, thus, the market gross rate of return is R∗ = δ−1.
The term applies to any group of projects supplying funds to each other as de￿ned earlier.
24In accordance with both these de￿nitions, we can say that the empty set is stable. This
means that at least one stable coalition exists. Since there is no entry, the number of projects
in the economy can only weakly decrease in time. However, the rate at which projects
disappear and the stable coalition that is reached depends on the history of states of nature
that were realized. This means that project failures that follow temporary liquidity shocks
make shocks permanent. With no entry of projects in the system, a failure in period t may
trigger further failures in the future. Suppose that the set of stable coalitions achievable by a
given allocation mechanism includes sets other than the empty set. We can say that a system
is fragile because the history of realized states can force the system towards a less valuable
stable coaltion. In the extreme, a system can be forced towards the empty set. Furthermore,
since all ￿rms that belong to any stable coalition would have had an episode of distress but
was re￿nanced, they all have positive value, both in the individual and contributory sense.
Hence, the stable coalition with the larger number of projects is more valuable than one with
a smaller number of projects.
The set of states in which all projects survive in a stable coalition is the set S itself since
there are no bankruptcies. The value of a coalition is then simply equal to the discounted









Projects are also easy to value in a decentralized market when we have a stable coalition,





for all projects y in a stable coalition.
Result 1. If y is a stable coalition in a decentralized market, then it is stable in a centralized
institution.
25Proofs of this Result is given in Appendix A.
Result 2. If y is a stable coalition in a centralized environment, it may not be stable in a
decentralized one.
A counterexample is enough to prove this last result. Consider the following simple
environment with two projects y and z and 4 equiprobable states of nature. The following
table gives the bene￿ts of each project in each state of nature:
s : 1 2 3
y : -1 Y 1
z : 1 0 -1
with Y > 0. Note that the economy faces no aggregate liquidity constraint. Suppose that the
current state of nature is s = 3, so that project z is in ￿nancial distress. On a decentralized
market, if project z was re￿nanced in state 3, its market value would be Vm(z) = 0. This
is a contradiction because the required funds, −z(3) = 1, being greater than the discounted
market value at all levels of the interest rate, project z cannot ￿nd re￿nancing in state 3.
Hence, project z is bankrupt in state 3. However, next period, y could be in ￿nancial distress
in state 1 with a need of −y(1) = 1 of funds. If project z has been bankrupt the period
before, no funds are available for project y; there is now an aggregate liquidity constraint due
to the disappearance of project z. Project y has, then, to fail also, even if its future value,
be it some liquidity available to re￿nance it, would be Y/(3(1 − δ)) > 1 for Y su￿ciently
high.
A central planner would allocate funds di￿erently. Maximizing the value of coalition
{y,z}, it would allow project z to survive today in state 3 so that project y can be re￿nanced
tomorrow if state 1 occurs.
Note that the contribution of project z in the centralized coalition is not 0, although the
centralized value of the coalition is equal to V ({y,z}) = Y/(3(1−δ)), that is, the value of y
if there is no aggregate constraint. Indeed, in the absence of z, the liquidity constraint binds
26and y has to go bankrupt in state 1 . The contributory value of z is, then,
V
z({y,z}) = V ({y,z}) − V0(y) =
δY − (3 − 3δ)
(3 − 3δ)(3 − 2δ)




This example illustrates Result 2, that is, there may be stable coalitions in the central-
ized case that cannot be reached on decentralized markets. Decentralized markets continue
bankrupting projects that would survive forever through a centralized decision process. This
allows us to conclude that a decentralized allocation mechanism on which projects exchange
liquidities at a market rate of return, is in general more fragile than a centralized one where
bankruptcies are managed in each state of nature in order to maximize the liquidity of the
system. Since a stable coaltion with a larger number of projects is more valuable than one
with a smaller number of ￿rms, the more fragile system also has a lower expected value in
the long run.
This may not be obvious in a static environment. Consider a two-period time horizon
in which the liquidity market opens in the ￿rst period and debt repayments take place in
the second period. In this case, Vm(y) is both the private (market) and social values of a
project y. Because the decentralized market re￿nances those projects with the highest market
value, subject to the liquidity constraint, it will also pick the ￿right￿ projects to re￿nance
and the spot market for liquidities yields an e￿cient allocation. In that sense, the market
is statically e￿cient. We have shown, however, that a dynamic (in￿nite-horizon) framework
yields a di￿erent result with respect to e￿ciency. In such a context, the decentralized market
is, in general, dynamically ine￿ciency. The problem is that market value only accounts for
the private value associated with a distressed project, that is, its expected discounted ￿ow
of future bene￿ts. It does not account for the fact that this project, if re￿nanced, may be
on the supply side of the market in the future and help relax the constraint on the supply
of funds. Hence, the ￿rst welfare theorem does not hold in this economy.
In appendix C, we provide a numerical example where centralized and decentralized
values are computed and compared. Dynamic ine￿ciency and the idea of ￿nancial fragility
associated with Result 2 are made explicit by the example.
276 Conclusion
We show, in this paper, that the e￿ciency of a liquidity allocation system depends on
its ability to measure the value of a project, taking into account its contribution to the
liquidity of the economy in future periods. This contribution is not taken into account of
by decentralized markets because it results in an externality which increases the values of
other projects. In general, the larger the number of projects, the higher is the diversi￿cation
of liquidity shocks. This means that an economy with a higher number of projects is less
fragile. The main result of this study is given in Result 2 and states that a competitive
liquidity market may be more fragile than a centralized institution. This has implications
on how a public authority could supervise ￿nancial markets to make sure that liquidities are
properly allocated among productive projects. The existence of a competitive ￿nancing rate
for liquidity exchanges is necessary to signal the opportunity cost of liquidities and drive the
price of capital in the economy. However, intervention by a market regulator to rescue a
distressed project that cannot ￿nd re￿nancing on the liquidity market can help ensure that
this liquidity market remains sound in the future.
It is interesting to consider the following interpretation to our model. The coalitional
model can be related to a ￿nancial market with a ￿nancial intermediary. The intermediary
allocates ￿nancing among its ￿rms to maximize the value of its portfolio of ￿rms. A long-
lived ￿nancial intermediary can therefore endogenize the type of externalities that prevent the
market from being e￿cient, that is, it can take into account the potential future contribution
of a ￿nancially distressed ￿rm when deciding to re￿nance it or not.
The only source of ￿nancial imperfection we consider is a potential shortage of liquidity
at the aggregate level. If markets cannot decentralize the optimal allocation, ￿rms may have
to use complicated long-term contracts which would depend on all realized shocks in the
economy. It would then be interesting to characterize the nature of these contracts when
they su￿er from this and other market imperfections such as non-commitment.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1
The ￿rst part comes directly from admissibility (AD). The second part, directly from the
budget balance condition (BB).
Proof of Lemma 2
If y−
s = ∅, the result is obvious. If y−
s 6= ∅, then the question becomes: given that we manage
to keep all projects solvent, would we want to drop a project now that aggregate liquidity has
risen? The answer is ￿No￿. Suppose that in state s ∈ S∗ the coalition z survives, and that
projects w ⊂ z are bankrupt in state s0 ∈ S∗. This implies that
Σz(s) + δV (z) ≥ Σz \ w(s) + δV (z \ w). (9)
In state s0, y increases for all projects. Given stationarity, this a￿ects only the ￿rst term on
each side of condition (9). Since there are more projects in z than in z \ w, this condition
must also be satis￿ed in state s0. Hence, it is not optimal to bankrupt more projects in s0
than in s.
29Proof of Result 1
Since budget balance holds, the market rate of return has to be equal to δ−1. The stability
of y implies that all y in y are such that y(s) + δVm(y) ≥ 0 for any possible s. Suppose y
is not stable with a centralized institution, then, there is a state s in which sub-coalition ¯ z
must optimally be bankrupt. This also writes:
Σy(s) + δV (y) < Σz(s) + δV (z),
where z is the value maximizing coalition in state s, that is, the complement of ¯ z in y. This
implies
Σ ¯ z(s) + δ(V (y) − V (z)) < 0.
By stability on the decentralized market, we must have that




This means that the contribution (V (y) − V (z)) of ¯ z to the centralized value of y is smaller
than its market value, that is, a contradiction.
Appendix B
The decentralized equilibrium.
Various possible equilibrium con￿gurations are represented in ￿gure 1. In this ￿gure, the
demand is constant but many supply curves (from Y S
0 to Y S
4 ) are drawn by changing the
values of δ and Σy+. Only Y S
1 is drawn in full for δ = 1
10 and Σy+ = 9 (the numbers are
arbitrary).
The aggregate demand is that of 7 troubled projects with pairs (−y(s),Vy) equal to
{(2,30),(3,36),(2,20),(3,30),(3,21),(2,6),(2,6)}.
30At prices R > 15, no project is solvent and all demand zero fund. At price R = 15, the
￿rst project becomes solvent since Vy/R = 30/15 ≥ −y(s) = 2. At that price, the owners
of the project are indi￿erent between rescuing or not the project, so that the demand for
funds is either 2 or zero. For any lower price, that project is surely ￿nanced. For any price
R ∈ (12,15], this is the only project that can be ￿nanced. At price R = 12, the second
project may be ￿nanced since 36/12 ≥ 3. Whether it is or not, the demand for funds is
either 5 = 2+3 or 2. A marginal decrease in R sets the demand at 5. At price R = 10, two
other projects can be ￿nanced, both having their ratio Vy/R equal to 10. Whether, zero,
one or both projects are rescued, the aggregate demand equals 5, 7, 8 or 10. Then the price
must be lowered to 7 to make project (3,21) solvent, etc.
Let R ≡ maxy−{−V/y(s)} and R ≡ miny−{−V/y(s)} . The generic equilibrium con￿gu-
rations are
• When δ−1 > R no project is ever solvent at a price for which there is a positive supply
of funds. Then any R ∈ (R,δ−1] is an equilibrium price with Y D(R∗) = 0. See the
case with Y S
6 in ￿gure 1. The equilibrium set is E6.
• When Y D(R∗) = Y S(R∗) like at the crossing of the demand and the supply curve Y S
3 .
Then R∗ ∈ [R,R]. See the case with Y S
3 and the equilibrium point E3.
• When δ−1 < R and all projects are solvent. Then there is a su￿cient supply of liquidi-
ties on the market to make rescuing all troubled projects pro￿table. The equilibrium
price is then R∗ = δ−1 and Y D(R∗) = Σy−. See the case with Y S
5 and the equilibrium
point E5.
There are many instances of multiple equilibria that involve di￿erent equilibrium allocations
(like with Y S
1 ) but they are non generic cases. The supply curve Y S
2 yields an instance where






























































































































































Let the state of nature s be uniformly distributed on S = [0,1]. Consider a coalition of two
projects y = {y1,y2}. Let us assume that project yi’s bene￿t is linear in s:
yi(s) = (bi − ai)s + ai.
Assume without loss of generality that b1 − a1 = 1 and let yh
i = max{ai,bi} and yl
i =
min{ai,bi}. Project yi’s random return is uniformly distributed on [yl
i,yh
i ]. Its expected











y1 − a1, so that
y2 = a2 − (a2 − b2)(y1 − a1),
= −αy1 + (a2 + αa1),
with α = a2 − b2. Notice that total output is given by
y(s) = y1(s) + y2(s) = a + (1 − α)s,
where a = a1 + a2.
We assume that α > 0 so that y1 and y2 are perfectly negatively correlated. Total output
y(s) is positively correlated with s if α < 1. Without loss of generality, we assume that this
is the case so that 0 < α < 1. With this parameterization, variation of the total output
re￿ects mostly variations in y1.
We also assume that total output is always positive by setting a > 0. Our example is,
then, speci￿c in the sense that the aggregate liquidity constraint never binds. However, this
assumption allows us to have that {y1,y2} can possibly form a stable coalition.
33Our assumptions so far imply that y1 is distributed on [a1,b1] with yl
1 = a1 < 0 < b1 = yh
1
and that y2 is distributed on [b2,a2] with yl
2 = b2 < 0 < a2 = yh
2. Besides, yh
1 > 0 implies
that 1 + a1 > 0 and yl
2 < 0 implies that α > a2.
We partition the set of states of nature [0,1] into speci￿c events. Let Si be the event
where project i survives and the other project goes bankrupt. The set of states where both
projects survive, either because they have positive returns or because they re￿nance each
other, is denoted S12. Note that, since projects’ bene￿ts are negatively correlated, low (high)
realizations of state s correspond to low (high) realizations of y1 and high (low) realizations
of y2. Therefore, the three events correspond to ranked sub-intervals of [0,1]. If not empty,
S2 corresponds to low values of s, and S1 to high values of s, whereas intermediate values of
s belong to event S12.


























Finally, let us denote V∅(yi), the value of project i that would be realized if it was











34The centralized value of the coalition
Let s and s de￿ne the boundaries of the aforementioned events. Those values are such that
y1(s) = y∗∗
1 and y2(s) = y∗∗
2 . The state s (resp. s) is the lowest (highest) state where project
1 (project 2) survives. Hence,
S2 = [0,s], S12 = [s,s], S1 = [s,1].
The centralized value of coalition y is given by formula (8) in section 3:
V (y) = max
S12∈A
µ(S12)(E(Σy|S12) + δV (y)) + µ(¬S12)E(ν|¬S12), (10)
where the solution S12 is the event S∗ that maximizes the coalition value. For simplicity,
let us now write V (y) = V , V0(yi) = V 0
i and V∅(yi) = V ∅
i . Hence, ￿nding the value of the
coalition amounts to ￿nd the highest ￿xed point V of
V − M
∗(V ) = 0, (11)
where M∗(V ) is the r.h.s. of (10).
M















s.t. s ≥ 0, (12)
1 − s ≥ 0. (13)
The solution to that constrained problem is







0 if V ≥ V 0
2 − a1/δ,
−(a1 + δ(V − V 0
2 )) else.







1 if V ≥ V 0
1 − b2/δ,
(a2 + δ(V − V 0
1 ))/α else.
35Notice that since V (y) ≥ V0(y1) + V0(y2), we have that V > V 0
i for i = 1,2. This implies





−a1 − δ(V − V
0
2 ) < a2 + δ(V − V
0
1 ),
< (a2 + δ(V − V
0
1 ))/α,
max{0,−a1 − δ(V − V
0




In any event, the solution M∗(V ) is a piecewise quadratic di￿erentiable function of V .
Next, consider the following parameter values that yield an interior solution in s and s.
First set yl
i + yh
i = 0 so that V ∅
i = 0 for all i. This ensures that projects have more value
in autarky than if they are unconditionally re￿nanced V 0
i > V ∅
i for all i. Hence, liquidating
a project can be an option in some states, that is, Si 6= ∅, i = 1,2. This also means that
coalition y is not stable.
Let α = 1/2. These values imply that project 1’s returns are distributed on [−1/2,1/2]
and project 2’s returns are distributed on [−1/4,1/4]. The discount rate is set su￿ciently
low so that the system has interior solutions for the critical states: δ = 1/4. With these
values, we compute that
V
0
1 = 2/14 ' 0.14286, V
0
2 = 1/14 ' 0.07143.
The value V of the coalition will be at least as great as the sum V 0
1 +V 0
2 = 3/14 ' 0.21429
but should not exceed much that value. Conditions for an interior solution are
−a1 − δ(V − V
0
2 ) > 0
(a2 + δ(V − V
0











2 − a1/δ = 29/14 ' 2.07,
V
0
1 − b2/δ = 16/14 ' 1.14.
It seems unlikely that V ≥ 16/14 or V ≥ 29/14. Hence assume as an educated guess that








































In autarky, project 1 is solvent as long as y1(s) ≥ 0, that is for s ≥ −a1 = 1/2 and
project 2 is solvent as long as y2(s) ≥ 0, that is for s ≤ a2/α = 1/2. The coalition allows
optimal re￿nancing of project 1 by project 2 over [s,1/2] ' [0.46,0.50] and of project 2 by
project 1 over [1/2,s] ' [0.50,0.54].
Decentralized values
In a decentralized market, projects are re￿nanced as long as their continuation value is
greater than their cash requirement. In a rational expectations equilibrium, continuation
values depend on which of the three possible event, S1, S2 or S12 is realized. We now denote:
S2 = [0, ˆ s1], S12 = [ˆ s1, ˆ s2], S1 = [ˆ s2,1].
37The current market value of project 1 in state s depends on which of these three event s
belongs to. Let us write vm





     
     
0 if s ∈ [0, ˆ s1),
y1(s) + δV m
1 if s ∈ [ˆ s1, ˆ s2],
y1(s) + δV 0






= (1 − ˆ s1)E(y1|s ≥ ˆ s1) + δ(ˆ s2 − ˆ s1)V
m




(1 − ˆ s1)(a1 + (1 + ˆ s1)/2) + δ(1 − ˆ s2)V 0
1
1 − δ(ˆ s2 − ˆ s1)
.





     
     
0 if s ∈ (ˆ s2,1],
y2(s) + δV m
2 if s ∈ [ˆ s1, ˆ s2],
y2(s) + δV 0






= ˆ s2E(y2|s ≤ ˆ s2) + δ(ˆ s2 − ˆ s1)V
m




ˆ s2(a2 − αˆ s2/2) + δˆ s1V 0
2
1 − δ(ˆ s2 − ˆ s1)
.
In a decentralized market, both projects will be re￿nanced as long as yi(s) + δV m
i ≥ 0.
Critical values ˆ s1 and ˆ s2 are such that yi(ˆ si) + δV m
i = 0 or
y1(ˆ s1) + δV
m
1 = 0,
y2(ˆ s2) + δV
m
2 = 0.
Applying the parameter values used in the centralized case gives the following non-linear
system with two unknown, ˆ s1 and ˆ s2:
(1/2)ˆ s
2
1 + 4ˆ s1 − ˆ s1ˆ s2 + (13/28)ˆ s2 − (55/28) = 0,
(1/4)ˆ s
2
2 − 2ˆ s2 − (1/2)ˆ s1ˆ s2 + (15/56)ˆ s1 + 1 = 0.
38And it is (numerically) solved in
ˆ s1 ' 0.464123,
ˆ s2 ' 0.535877.












The di￿erent values found with this simulation are summarized in the following table.
Centralized Sol. ￿ ￿ V = 0.21525983 [s,s] = [0.4640,0.5362]
Market Solution V m
1 = 0.1435 V m
2 = 0.0717 V m
1 + V m
2 = 0.21525980 [ˆ s1, ˆ s2] = [0.4641,0.5359]
Autarky V 0
1 = 0.1429 V 0
2 = 0.0714 V 0
1 + V 0
2 = 0.21429 [0.50,0.50]
In that simple example with no aggregate liquidity constraint, it appears that the centralized
institution can value the externality each ￿rm plays on the value of the other. The total
market value, V , is greater than the sum of both market values, V m
1 +V m
2 . This is also made
clear by the range of states of nature on which both ￿rm can survive. This range is greater
with a centralized institution, [s,s] = [0.4640,0.5362], than with a decentralized liquidity
market [ˆ s1, ˆ s2] = [0.4641,0.5359].
39